Few would disagree with Gregory's statement that some of what we think we see and know is wrong: Illusions and misconceptions, at many levels, are part of everyday life. But if, as Gregory suggested, our visual knowledge arises from a lengthy history of interacting with objects, how can those physical interactions be so accurate if our perceptions about objects are subject to illusions? This review will build on the idea-developed over the past decade and most closely associated with Milner and Goodale (1993, 1996) -that an answer to that question can be found in a partial separation between cortical networks for visual perception and those for the visual control of action Bridgeman, 1992; Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Milner, 1995; Milner & Goodale, 1993 . One system, which we have called the vision-for-action (VFA) system , maps on-line visual inputs onto motor coordinates to guide movement (see Figure 1 ). Another system subserves visual perception, and therefore it can be called the vision-for-perception (VFP) system.
As Gregory (2001) noted, the VFP system is susceptible to illusions, some of which occur commonly in everyday experience and can create the foundation for majestic misapprehensions. According to the ancient Greek myth, for example, Apollo used a horse-drawn chariot to pull the sun across the sky, and for millennia, our ancestors believed that a small sun moved through a large stationary sky surrounding a flat earth. The VFP system appears to have the implicit knowledge-based, as Gregory said, on millions of years of interacting with objectsthat large background frames are stationary and that perceptually smaller objects move in relation to such frames. As we elaborate below, an illusion much like that of the sun moving through the sky has found a place as an experimental tool in both psychophysics and neurophysiology laboratories.
As for the VFA system, Koch and Crick (2001) referred to it as "the zombie within." The word zombie refers to the notional construct of a will-less being that can behave only automatically. These entities are thought experiments that have the behavioral, functional, and structural properties of a person but lack consciousness, in the sense that this implies qualitative mental states, experiences (termed qualia by philosophers of mind), or awareness based on those states. Zombies process information as do humans, represent that information in their "brains," and appear to behave in a purposive manner; that is, their actions seem as though they intend to achieve some goal. But zombies cannot experience the essence of sensory inputs and lack genuine intention. Just as a zombie cannot appreciate the blueness of the sky (a qualium), it also cannot appreciate the goal of its action, a concept sometimes called "intrinsic intentionality." A zombie says things but does not mean anything by its words and does things but does not intend to achieve anything through its actions (in the sense implied by intrinsic intentionality). The consequence of this concept is a division of brain activity into zombielike and conscious components. As Koch and Crick pointed out, Many mammalian brain systems perform complex yet routine tasks without direct conscious input. . . . Such systems can deal with certain commonly encountered situations automatically, which is why we call them "zombie" agents. One can become conscious of the actions of one's own zombie, but usually only in retrospect. The best evidence comes from studying dissociation of "vision for perception" and "vision for action" in both healthy humans and patients. (p. 893) The first part of this review will discuss some of the evidence for that dissociation. Note that when we use the term separation or dissociation with regard to the VFA and VFP systems, we imply neither an anatomical segregation nor a complete one. Instead, we refer only to behavioral or physiological dissociations, which are never more than partial. Whether these systems have separable anatomical correlates is a topic addressed below in some detail.
Concepts such as perception and zombie agents lead inevitably to a consideration of one of the central problems in neurophysiology: the neuronal correlate of consciousness (Crick & Koch, 1998) . Clearly, we cannot address the hard-fought and deep philosophical conundrums involving consciousness, awareness, qualia, zombies, and so forth that have produced volumes over centuries. We can, however, apply explicit and consistent terms and concepts to the present discussion, even at the risk of oversimplification, and we have chosen those that appear to us to be of potential benefit in behavioral and cognitive neuroscience. When we use the term perception, we refer explicitly to conscious awareness, usually of sensory inputs, but also of observed actions, corollary discharges, and internal states. Our word use does not represent a consensus or agreed-on conceptual content, and readers must bear in mind that the word perception has many other uses. One of these differs little, if at all, from sensation or sensory processing, but we will not use perception in that sense. For the purpose of this review, perception should be construed as equivalent to declarative memory, awareness, and explicit knowledge. And although we address the neural correlate of perception, in this sense, we do not consider many of the topics common to such discussions, such as the relative merit of studying neuronal firing rate, synchronization, oscillation, et cetera. Rather than addressing such measures and mechanisms, we will focus mainly on behavior, posing the following question: If one wants to study the neural correlate of visual perception in monkeys, what should we require the monkeys to do?
One answer to that question seems obvious: The monkeys should report what they see. Recent progress in 
BEHAVIORAL DISSOCIATION OF VFA AND VFP SYSTEMS
In 1799, the astronomer Alexander von Humbolt saw a star moving chaotically, or so he thought. The illusory nature of his perception remained unrecognized for decades, but now psychophysicists call it the autokinetic illusion. Observers perceive a stationary light spot, viewed in darkness, as drifting (Levy, 1972; Royce, Aftanas, Lehman, Blumenthal, & Carran, 1966) . The perception of chaotic drifting, however, does not prevent people from fixating gaze on the light spot with saccadic eye movements; that is, their eye movements do not mirror their perceptions. Thus, it has been known for more than a century that the visuomotor system is protected, at least to an extent, from visual illusions. For the sake of discussion, we call this the dissociationist view.
Sketch of the Dissociationist View
Milner, Goodale, and their colleagues have developed a "two-visual-systems" theory that encapsulates the dissociationist view. One visual system underlies visual perception; another subserves visuomotor control. Much of the clinical, psychophysical, and neuroanatomical background for that theory has been reviewed elsewhere Bridgeman, 1992; Milner & Goodale, 1996) , and we will not repeat that material here. In support of the dissociationist view, clinicians have long recognized disorders such as visual agnosia and Balint's syndrome. In the former disorder, patients can manipulate objects but have trouble identifying them; in the latter, patients can name and categorize objects but have difficulty manipulating them. Notwithstanding this long history, the data obtained from D. F., a patient with visual agnosia, sparked a resurgence of interest in such phenomena (Milner & Goodale, 1996) . D.F. suffered the effects of anoxia, which caused diffuse brain damage that is difficult to specify anatomically. The patient could not report, either verbally or through hand gestures, the orientation of a slot. In contrast, she could orient her hand to reach through the same slot. Milner and Goodale interpreted this finding as evidence for a functional separation between two visual systems: one for on-line control of movement and another for explicit reports.
Although the two-visual-systems theory originated partly from observing the effects of brain damage, researchers have also tested the idea in normal participants, often by exploring the effects of visual illusions. One study involved an illusion caused by discrete, instantaneous shifts of a background frame surrounding an attended light spot (see Figure 2B ). Deprived of any external reference other than the frame, participants did not detect the frame's shift within a few degrees of visual space. Instead of a frame shift, they reported a displacement of the light spot (Wong & Mack, 1981) . Furthermore, if the light spot moved in a given direction but the frame shifted further in the same direction, as illustrated in Figure 2C , participants reported that the light spot had shifted in the direction opposite to its actual displacement. In spite of that illusion, the participants accurately fixated the light spot with saccadic eye movements. For example, in Figure 2C , the attended light spot shifted one degree to the right. Because the frame shifted further to the right by 1 degree, the participants reported the illusion that the attended spot had shifted to the left. Despite this illusion, they could accurately guide their saccadic eye movements to the target, which required a rightward saccade. Thus, visuomotor behavior was shown to have immunity from the illusory perception in that experimental situation.
Similar findings have involved hand and arm movements. Goodale and his colleagues employed an illusion-sometimes termed the size-contrast illusion or the Ebbinhaus/Tischner illusion-that relies on the relative sizes of circles or disks in a visual scene (Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995) . Participants report that a disk surrounded by small disks appears larger than a congruent one surrounded by large disks (see Figure 3A , top). By adjusting the sizes of the two central disks, as illustrated in the bottom half of Figure 3A , the experimenters made disks of different sizes appear congruent. When the participants' hands approached the disks, their fingers moved further apart when reaching to larger disks (see Figure 3B ). This finding supported the two-visual-systems theory, which predicted that the visuomotor (VFA) system would reflect the physical reality better than the perceptual (VFP) system.
Comparable results have been reported for other types of illusions and for a variety of visually guided movements (Bridgeman, Gemmer, Forsman, & Huemer, 2000; Bridgeman & Huemer, 1998; Haffenden & Goodale, 1998; Servos, Carnahan, & Fedwick, 2000) . In those experiments, visually guided movements had a degree of protection from illusory perceptions. However, some investigators have found that visuomotor behavior was only weakly protected from perceptual errors, if at all (Daprati & Gentilucci, 1997; Ellis, Flanagan, & Lederman, 1999; Franz, Fahle, Bulthoff, & Gegenfurtner, 2001; Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bulthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Gentilucci, Chieffi, Deprati, Saetti, & Toni, 1996; Kerzel, Hommel, & Bekkering, 2001; Otto-de Haart, Carey, & Milne, 1999; Pavani, Boscagli, Benvenuti, Rabuffetti, & Farne, 1999) . Recent reviews have discussed those and other findings in detail (Carey, 2001; Norman, in press ), so we concentrate here on those aspects most germane to behavioral neurophysiology.
Critique of the Dissociationist View
Critics have challenged the dissociationist view on several grounds. Some investigators have pointed to problems involving selective attention (Franz et al., 2000 (Franz et al., , 2001 Pavani et al., 1999) . Because dissociationist experiments usually involve a comparison of behavior in two tasks, one visuomotor and the other perceptual, an interpretational problem arises if participants attend to visual inputs differently in the two tasks. Consider the perceptual errors evoked by visual illusions of the type illustrated in Figure 3A . Participants could have attended to the visual scene differently when asked to report their perception, as opposed to when they performed movements in the same scene. In visuomotor tasks, the disk they grasped might have been the only object or location attended. In perceptual tasks, attention might have been less narrowly focused. A related criticism involves the idea that participants might have processed different attributes of the visual scene in perceptual versus visuomotor tasks. For grasping the central disk in Figure  3A , the two fingers involved might have moved independently to the edges of the disk (Smeets & Brenner, 1999 , 2001a , 2001b . Perhaps, in those experiments, the control of grasping required only the coordinates of two points on the disk's edge, the targets of finger move- NOTE: A. Left: A frame (rectangle) and light spot (filled circle) originally appeared in the configuration shown in A1. The frame and the light spot next disappeared and reappeared in the configuration shown in A2, after which the participant responded with a saccade to the light spot and reported its shift direction. Right: Facsimile eye-position record and the participants' reports about light-spot shifts (in these examples, always left). In A, the frame did not shift location from A1 to A2. Accordingly, no illusion resulted and the participant made accurate reports and saccadic eye movements. When the participants, as instructed, "looked back" to the original location of the light spot, participants correctly reversed their previous eye movement. B. A trial, in the format of A, in which the target reappeared at the same location, but the frame shifted 1 degree to the right. The participants reported that the target had shifted to the left, but the eyes did not move. For the look-back saccade, having perceived that the light spot had shifted to the left, participants made a rightward saccade. C. A trial in which the light spot shifted 1 degree to the right, but the frame shifted 2 degrees to the right. The participants reported an illusory leftward movement of the target spot but made a saccade in the correct, rightward direction to fixate it. When instructed to look back to the spot's original location, the participants made an additional saccade to the right in an attempt to compensate for what they perceived (a leftward shift of the spot) and eye movement they inferred they had made (a leftward eye movement). ments, whereas the perceptual system used the entire edge to compute an object's size. According to this view, the illusion arose because nearby objects had more effect on the latter computation than on the former one.
Critics have scrutinized many other details of the dissociationist experiments as well. Some have suggested that the reaching hand could have occluded a portion of the visual scene (see Figure 3A) , resulting in a weaker illusion and thus mitigating motor errors in visuomotor tasks (Mon-Williams & Bull, 2000) . In some cases, the visuomotor system might have treated the visual stimuli surrounding the target as potential obstacles (Haffenden & Goodale, 2000) , which could have caused unexpected effects on reaching and grasping.
In addition, several investigators have reported circumstances in which movements lacked protection from illusions. In one example of an illusion-driven movement, experimental participants saw only one set of disks (e.g., one of the four configurations illustrated in Figure  3A ). In this condition, the size-contrast illusion affected perceived size and grip aperture equally, although it should be noted that the perceptual effects were smaller than when participants viewed two sets of disks (Franz et al., 2000 (Franz et al., , 2001 Pavani et al., 1999) . Visual illusions have also been shown to influence force production (Brenner & Smeets, 1996; Jackson & Shaw, 2000) and other movement parameters, such as movement time and velocity (Westwood, Dubrowski, Carnahan, & Roy, 2000) . According to van Donkelaar (1999) , the size-contrast illusion (see Figure 3A ) affected movement speed in accord with Fitts' law; that is, participants made slower movements to targets perceived as smaller (cf. Fischer, 2001 ).
Defense of the Dissociationist View
In an elegant series of experiments, Dyde and Milner (in press) used different types of visual illusions to probe the operations of the VFP and VFA systems. Contourinteraction illusions (see Figure 4A ) and rod-and-frame illusions (see Figure 4B ) both cause vertical lines to appear tilted. We take it for granted, as Dyde and Milner claimed, that contour-interaction illusions arise from lower visual areas, such as V1 and V2 (Tolhurst & Thompson, 1975) and that rod-and-frame illusions originate in higher visual areas (Zoccolotti, Antonucci, Daini, Martelli, & Spinelli, 1997) . Dyde and Milner (in press ) asked their participants to respond to the orientation of the central stimulus in several ways. In the visuomotor tasks, the participants performed reaching movements toward the stimuli. In the case of contour-interaction illusion, they placed and oriented a square plastic card against the stimulus, whereas in the case of rod-and-frame illusion they grasped the central rod with their forefinger and thumb. In the perceptual tasks, the participants reported their perception of stimulus orientation either by rotating the card in a separate location or adjusting a separately located rod until its orientation matched that of the stimulus. In accord with the dissociationist view, the lower vision type of illusion affected both perceptual reports and reaching movements, but the higher-vision illusion affected only perceptual reports: Participants could accurately grasp the central rod in Figure 4B , although they remained subject to tilt illusions. Furthermore, Dyde and Milner showed that when they combined the illusions of higher and lower vision-with opposite signs so that the perceptual effect was neutralized-perceptual errors decreased, whereas visuomotor errors remained more or less the same.
These findings of Dyde and Milner provide support for the dissociationist view as well as a potential account for some of the seemingly contradictory results. When illusions arise from higher vision, movements to the stimuli generating those illusions may have a degree of protection from perceptual errors. When illusions arise from lower vision, however, visuomotor guidance will not have that protection and illusion-driven movements will result. As an extreme case, were an illusion to result from information processing in the retina, both visuomotor and perceptual systems would be affected by it, at least in the short term. Intermediate situations, in which an illusion affects both lower and higher vision, probably represent the rule rather than the exception.
Another factor may also have contributed to the diversity in results: Because perceptions provide the basis for explicit memory, illusions should most strongly affect movements when participants use those memories in guiding action. Accordingly, several investigators have found that when participants had to use memory to guide their responses-either because the stimulus flashed briefly or the experimenters imposed a delay period-illusion-driven movement inaccuracies occurred (Fischer, 2001; Hu & Goodale, 2000; Westwood, Heath, & Roy, 2000) . Thus, it appears that the VFA system relies on its visual input when available but otherwise uses information stored by the VFP system. Glover and Dixon (2001) reached similar conclusions based on their observation that visual illusions had greater effects in the early portion of reaching movements. They explained their observations by suggesting that perceptions played a major role in motor planning, which mostly influenced the early parts of a trajectory, but that perceptions played only a minor role in on-line visuomotor control, which dominated the later parts of a movement. Wong and Mack (1981) also observed that illusory memories led to inaccurate movements. As summarized above, their results revealed that visually guided eye movements had immunity from an illusion-termed the frame-shift illusion-induced by discrete shifts of a background frame surrounding an attended light spot. In the conditions of Figure 2C , for example, participants reported that a light spot had jumped to the left but nevertheless made a rightward saccade to fixate it. Wong and Mack next asked their participants to look back to the initial position of the target, that is, to its remembered location. Not only were these "look-back saccades" no longer immune from the illusion, as was the case for a visible light spot, but they clearly reflected the illusory memories. For example, after having saccaded accurately to the right to fixate the light spot, the participants made an additional rightward look-back saccade to compensate for the leftward saccade that they recalled (wrongly) having made (see Figure 2C ). In a follow-up study in the skeletomotor domain, participants pointed at the vertices of Müller-Lyer figures (see Figure 4C ). For persistent stimuli, they pointed accurately to the vertices despite the illusion (Mack, Heuer, Villardi, & Chambers, 1985) . However, when the stimuli flashed briefly-and the participants had to rely on memory to guide their movement-illusion-driven inaccuracies were observed.
Could the possibility that participants used explicit memory instead of visual stimuli account for any of the controversies concerning the dissociationist view? It certainly could in experiments that used briefly presented stimuli or required responses after a delay period (Fischer, 2001; Hu & Goodale, 2000) . Under such circumstances, movements would be expected to have less immunity from illusions than would otherwise be the case. It also could when experimenters asked participants to perform a motor response immediately after reporting their perceptual judgments. That procedure should accentuate the effect of explicit memory on motor performance, although movements sometimes retain a degree of protection from illusions nevertheless (Carey, 2001) . Furthermore, some participants might have used explicit memory to guide action even when not required to do so and even when such use was counterproductive (Willingham, 1998) . Perhaps, feeling pressure to perform well, some participants "thought" too much about their responses and thus their movements reflected illusory percepts. In athletics, this phenomenon is known as "choking."
From the studies cited above, we conclude that the VFA and VFP systems can be dissociated behaviorally, especially for information processing involved in higher vision. However, a behavioral dissociation does not imply an anatomical one, and in the next section, we address whether the distinction between VFA and VFP systems applies at an anatomical level as well. Milner and Goodale (1993, 1996) have proposed that the VFA and VFP systems correspond to the dorsal and ventral visual "streams," respectively (see Figure 5 ). Although that idea is attractive, several alternatives have been proposed. Among these, the oldest involves a division of the VFA and VFP systems along an anterior-posterior cortical axis (see Figure 6 ) rather than the dorsalventral one proposed by Milner and Goodale. A third idea (not illustrated) is that the VFA system can be localized to the basal ganglia and their corticostriatal inputs, whereas the VFP system involves other structures.
ANATOMICAL CORRELATES OF VFA AND VFP SYSTEMS
The localization of VFA and VFP systems to specific brain structures would have dramatic implications for neurophysiology. Such knowledge would solve a fundamental problem: By examining the physiology of a VFP area, one can study VFP physiology, and likewise for the VFA system. Unfortunately, none of the anatomical schemes mentioned above has found convincing support.
Is the Frontal Cortex the Seat of the VFA System?
The concept of perceptual versus executive areas of the cerebral cortex originated from the classification of the central nervous system, more generally, into sensory and motor components. In that tradition, the VFP system might be considered as part of a sensory hierarchy, and the VFA system as part of a motor hierarchy. Fuster (1998 Fuster ( , 2000 Fuster ( , 2001 Quintana & Fuster, 1999) has been the most ardent advocate of this position, which is inherent in the perception-to-action cycle illustrated in Figure  6 . We were surprised to learn from Macmillan (1992 Macmillan ( , 2000 that this concept can be traced as far back as 1876, the year of Custer's last stand, in virtually unchanged form (see Figure 7 ). According to this view, cortical areas anterior to the central sulcus are motor, and more posterior areas are sensory. However, reciprocal connections between sensory areas and their motor counterparts in the hierarchy make such a stark conceptual division between sensory and motor systems highly problematic. Even at the spinal level, cyclic interactions between sensory inputs and motor outputs occur: Movements cause changes in the sensory inputs, which in turn result in modulations of motor outputs. At higher levels of the nervous system, the differentiation between the sensory and motor structures presents difficulties that go far deeper.
Even for primary motor cortex (M1), the "purest" of motor areas in the traditional scheme and the most likely candidate for a VFA correlate, neurophysiologists have repeatedly observed nonmotor signals. M1 has been reported to show activity reflecting mental rotation (Georgopoulos, Lurito, Petrides, Schwartz, & Massey, 1989; Georgopoulos, Taira, & Lukashin, 1993; Lurito, Georgakopoulos, & Georgopoulos, 1991; Wexler, Kosslyn, & Berthoz, 1998) , sensory cues (Pellizzer, Sargent, & Georgopoulos, 1995) , movement decisions based on serial order (Carpenter, Georgopoulos, & Pellizzer, 1999) , kinesthetic illusions induced by muscle vibration (Naito, Ehrsson, Geyer, Zilles, & Roland, 1999) , and vibrotactile discriminations (Salinas & Romo, 1998) , among other signals. A similar appreciation has developed for the premotor areas, where nonmotor signals (Boussaoud & Wise, 1993a , 1993b Graziano, 1999; Graziano & Gross, 1998; Vaadia, Kurata, & Wise, 1988) and serial-order effects (Clower & Alexander, 1998 ) have also been observed, along with activity reflecting a visuospatial goal, independent of movement trajectory (Schwartz, Moran, & Reina, 2001; Shen & Alexander, 1997) . Other signals in premotor cortex that vary from the strictly motor include mirror neurons, which have been reported to discharge when monkeys and experimenters perform similar actions (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) . Neuroimaging studies in human subjects have also indicated that nonmotor signals occur prominently in premotor cortex. In one study, for example, a rostral part of the premotor cortex showed increased activity during the execution of mental operations, and specific control conditions ruled out an account for that result in terms of subvocal rehearsal (Hanakawa et al., in press) .
If distinguishing sensory from motor signals has proved problematic in traditional motor areas, in other areas, such as the anterior frontal cortex (usually known as prefrontal cortex), even greater difficulties have arisen. For example, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that neuronal activity in anterior frontal cortex reflects neither sensory inputs nor motor signals but rather their combination (see Wise, Murray, & Gerfen, 1996 , for a review). Like Custer's soldiers, old ideas die hard, and work on anterior frontal cortex has continued to pursue the fool's errand of classifying neuronal activity there as either sensory or motor. For example, Constantinidis, Franowicz, and Goldman-Rakic (2001) trained monkeys to make delayed saccades toward the location of the brighter of two visual stimuli that briefly flashed on the video screen. The activity of anterior frontal neurons reflected the brightness of the stimuli, even if a stimulus did not serve as an overt response target on any given trial. Constantinidis et al. interpreted their findings as demonstrating a purely sensory function for anterior frontal neurons. However, a procedure used in that study-decreasing the difference in luminance between the target and distractor-resulted in uncertainty about the correct saccade target, as signified by an increase in erroneous responses. As a result, even on the trials performed correctly, the distractor location served as a possible movement target, and the monkey could well have prepared a movement to that target, without executing it. This phenomenon has been established in posterior parietal cortex (Kalaska & Crammond, 1995) and in premotor cortex (Cisek & Kalaska, 2002) , both of which project directly to anterior frontal cortex, and thus provides a plausible account for the findings of Constantinidis et al. (2001) in terms of visuomotor integration rather than purely sensory information processing.
Although we expect that efforts to classify cortical areas as sensory or motor will continue, the evidence and experience obtained to date demonstrate the ultimate sterility of that effort. This outlook does not imply that all cortical areas have the same capacity for influencing movement as does M1 or the premotor areas. The evidence indicates, however, that the effort to label most cortical areas as either motor or sensory vastly oversimplifies their function.
Is the Basal Ganglia the Seat of the VFA System?
A competing idea holds that the basal ganglia and their corticostriatal projections uniquely and selectively support the VFA system (Mishkin & Petri, 1984) . This view remains popular, although it was originally based on neuroanatomical concepts that have long since been discarded. For example, until the late 1970s, most neuroanatomists considered the basal ganglia as a whole to be the principal component of the "extrapyramidal" motor system. Now, it is understood that much of the motor function of the basal ganglia involves the pyramidal tract, albeit indirectly. And until the early 1980s, the conventional wisdom held that cortical inputs to the basal ganglia, including those from posterior cortex, "funneled back" exclusively to primary motor and premotor areas (Kemp & Powell, 1970) . Now, neuroanatomists recognize that instead of funneling all information back to motor and premotor areas, the regions of striatum and pallidum that receive inputs from the inferior temporal cortex and the anterior frontal cortex send outputs back to those same cortical areas (Middleton & Strick, 2000) .
The newer ideas about basal ganglia anatomy suggest that many parallel "loops" perform computations that reflect information processing in the cortical areas and thalamic nuclei supplying inputs to each part of the basal ganglia. Some of these loops deal primarily with motor information, but others participate in different functions. The many additional problems with the literature ascribing VFA function to the basal ganglia have been reviewed previously (Wise, 1996) . Briefly, the deficits seen in patients with basal ganglia disease-including those involving mirror reading, visual discrimination, rotary pursuit, puzzle solving, and serial reaction-time tasks-probably result from a persistence of actions mediated by the VFA system rather than from their loss, as would be expected if the basal ganglia were the seat of the VFA system. Instead of the basal ganglia mediating relatively automatic behaviors, often termed habits, it appears that damage to the basal ganglia releases them. Likewise, after experimental depletions of dopamine in the caudate nucleus, marmosets focused more on responding according to previously learned rules and showed less distractibility (Crofts et al., 2001) . Thus, the published findings do not accord with the predictions of theories identifying basal ganglia with the VFA system. They suggest, instead, that the VFA system depends more on corticocortical interactions and cerebellar mechanisms, along with a contribution from some (but by no means all) parts of the basal ganglia.
Whereas the precise anatomical localization of the VFA system remains unknown, it is well established that the VFA system can function perfectly well without certain brain structures. The famous patient H. M., whose hippocampus was removed surgically along with some adjacent structures and fiber systems, retains the ability to acquire new motor skills (Corkin, 1968; Shadmehr, Brandt, & Corkin, 1998) . Furthermore, monkeys with lesions to the hippocampus and some nearby areas learn motor skills as fast and as well as unoperated controls (Zola-Morgan & Squire, 1985) and can continue to choose responses based on highly familiar symbolic cues (i.e., cues involving shape and color vision), nearly without error (Wise & Murray, 1999) .
Is the Dorsal Stream the Seat of the VFA System?
If the identification of the VFA system with the frontal lobe or with the basal ganglia fails to hold water, what then of the identification of the VFA system with the dorsal visual stream (Goodale, 1996 (Goodale, , 1998 Milner & Goodale, 1993 ? Dorsal stream. One recent study examined the cortical areas underlying visual awareness by requiring the performance of two tasks simultaneously (Beck, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001 ). In the first task, they detected occurrences of the letter X in letter strings presented at the center of a visual display. At the same time, two images appeared in the left and right parts of the screen, which could be faces or outdoor scenes. In addition to the Xdetection task, the participants were also supposed to report changes in these images during a trial. Because of this dual-task design, the participants often failed to detect changes in the images, a phenomenon known as change blindness. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Beck et al. found that when participants perceived the changes in a scene, enhanced activity occurred both in the posterior parietal cortex and in the anterior frontal cortex (as well as in ventral-stream visual areas). (Perhaps a role for posterior parietal cortex in reorienting attention toward the detected changes might account for this finding, but a recent study has concluded that spatial attention depends on superior temporal areas rather than on posterior parietal cortex [Karnath, Ferber, & Himmelbach, 2001] ). Taking the results of Beck et al. at face value, they suggest that conscious detection of visual changes correlates not only with enhanced activity in the ventral stream but also with activity increases in the posterior parietal areas of the dorsal stream. Several neuroimaging papers have reported similar results (Dehaene et al., 2001; Kleinschmidt, Buchel, Zeki, & Frackowiak, 1998; Lumer, Friston, & Rees, 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999; Portas, Strange, Friston, Dolan, & Frith, 2000; Vuilleumier et al., 2001 ; see also Rees, 2001; , even when no motor report was produced (Lumer & Rees, 1999) . These studies suggest that interactions among broad cortical networks, including both the ventral and dorsal streams and several frontal areas, give rise to visual perception.
Similar conclusions come from stimulation and lesions of posterior parietal cortex. Transcranial magnetic stimulation over the right parietal cortex was found to induce errors in a perceptual task (Fierro, Brighina, Piazza, Oliveri, & Bisiach, 2001) , for example. Furthermore, in a clinical study, a patient with bilateral damage to the posterior parietal cortex had difficulty not only in reaching toward visual targets, as predicted by the idea that the dorsal stream subserves the VFA system, but also in the ability to describe the locations of the same targets (Baylis & Baylis, 2001 ). The patient showed no evidence of damage to the ventral stream pathways.
In view of this evidence for posterior parietal participation in the VFP system, some published data might appear in a new light. Take, for example, the finding that when participants observed object-oriented actions, blood flow increased in posterior parietal (and premotor) cortex and did so in much the same areas as when the participants executed the same actions (Buccino et al., 2001) . These results support an involvement of posterior parietal cortex in perceiving as well as in executing actions. A related possibility is that posterior parietal cortex neurons participate in perceiving the location of an effector, such as the hand, in relation to targeted objects. The converse is well accepted: Several studies have concluded that parietal neurons encode target location relative to an effector (Lacquaniti, Guigon, Bianchi, Ferraina, & Caminiti, 1995; Snyder, Batista, & Andersen, 1997 . Perhaps the same neurons also contribute to perceiving the effector's location rela-tive to objects within a visual scene. Other neurophysiological phenomena might also reflect the perception of effectors (Graziano, Cooke, & Taylor, 2000 ; see also Graziano, 1999) . Figure 1 depicts reafference as an important aspect of perceiving of action, and Graziano and his colleagues have reported reafferent signals in posterior parietal cortex. Some posterior parietal neurons were reported to encode the location of the arm based on both proprioceptive and visual inputs. Interestingly, those neurons also responded to vision of a realistic false arm but not unrealistic substitutes for the arm, as if effector (vs. object) location was specifically encoded. These findings are usually interpreted in terms of motor control theories, but it seems to us as likely that these neurophysiological processes contribute to the perception of effectors and actions. This possibility finds some support in human psychophysical studies, which have shown that moving visual backgrounds induced the perception of limb motion (Tardy-Gervet, Gilhodes, & Roll, 1982 .
Taken together, the studies cited above cast doubt on the idea that posterior parietal cortex-as part of the VFA system-plays a strictly visuomotor role with little contribution to perception. It seems more likely that the dorsal visual stream, especially its higher order cortical areas in the posterior parietal cortex, contributes to both perception and visually guided action. What, then, about the correlation of the ventral stream exclusively with the VFP system? Ventral stream. Neuroimaging results indicate that activation of ventral stream areas is not sufficient for visual awareness. Studies in patients with damage to V1 (Goebel, Muckli, Zanella, Singer, & Stoerig, 2001; Sahraie et al., 1997) or right parietal cortex (Rees et al., 2000; Vuilleumier et al., 2001) showed activation of ventral visual areas, although the patients failed to perceive a visual stimulus. Similarly, masked words activated ventral-stream areas, although participants failed to notice the words (Dehaene et al., 2001 ). Thus, ventral stream activation does not imply awareness of the stimuli causing the increased activation.
Considerable neuropsychological work in monkeys provides evidence that the ventral stream plays an important role in certain forms of visuomotor guidance. In one form of such guidance, often termed conditional motor learning, the color and shape of stimuli guide the choice of action. Use of such nonspatial visual cues to guide movement requires intact interactions between the inferior temporal cortex and parts of the anterior frontal cortex (Bussey, Wise, & Murray, 2001, in press; Eacott & Gaffan, 1992; Gaffan & Harrison, 1988) , but not an intact posterior parietal cortex (Rushworth, Nixon, & Passingham, 1997) . Similar to the result of Rushworth et al., a patient with a bilateral posterior parietal cortex lesion showed nearly normal timing for correcting reaching movements when these corrections were instructed by changes in the color of the targets (Pisella et al., 2000) . Thus, the human and monkey data both point to the ventral visual stream (and inferotemporal cortex) and away from the dorsal visual stream (and the posterior parietal cortex) as the mediator of nonspatial visuomotor guidance. We conclude, therefore, that the guidance of action does not depend exclusively on the dorsal stream. Brain-imaging studies have led to the same conclusion Toni, Ramnani, Josephs, Ashburner, & Passingham, 2001 ).
The conclusion that the dorsal stream plays a role in both the VFA and VFP systems and that the ventral stream does so as well does not imply an equal contribution to each system. In our view, both streams play perceptual and visuomotor roles but do so to an extent that reflects the type of information that they process (see Figure 12 ). The prevalence of the ventral stream's color, texture, and shape information and the predominance of the dorsal stream's spatial information bias their respective contributions to perception and visually guided movement.
PROBLEMS IN DISTINGUISHING THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF PERCEPTION AND ACTION
If VFA and VFP systems have little neuroanatomical separation at higher cortical levels, how can neurophysiologists study them independently? Until recently, both methodological and ideological limitations have hampered neurophysiological approaches to this problem, especially in monkeys.
The fundamental methodological problem results from the simple fact that a monkey's perception can be made accessible to an external observer only by converting it into some kind of overt action. But as described above, goal-directed actions of enormous complexity and sophistication can be performed in the absence of awareness. In blindsight, for example, patients claim that they do not see stimuli presented in the blind field but remain capable of producing motor responses toward those stimuli (Azzopardi & Cowey, 1997; Weiskrantz, 1995) . The unawareness persists even if blindsight patients use manual responses to make perceptual reports (Weiskrantz, Barbur, & Sahraie, 1995) , so the means of reporting does not appear to be critical. Thus, it is clear that a motor report does not, in itself, demonstrate awareness. Most studies of perception in monkeys have progressed without concern for such criticism, notwithstanding the fact that they always involve a monkey making a motor response at some point. It will not do to simply assume that such a response reflects perception if, as in this review, that term is taken to imply awareness. Nor will it do to claim that the characteristics of behavior match quantitatively the psychophysics of human perception; those similarities could result from receptor properties or other low-level processing common to both the VFA and VFP systems.
The ideological problem alluded to above involves the persistent strain of behaviorism in contemporary neuroscience. Many experts on behavior who will deny adopting a behaviorist stance nevertheless speak and write in terms scarcely distinguishable from the most ardent behaviorists of the 1950s or 1960s. They dismiss the idea that nonhuman animals possess a VFP system (e.g., Tulving, 2001 ) and attempt to explain all (or nearly all) behavior in terms of zombielike operant and Pavlovian conditioning. This outlook is receding from the dominance it once had; behavioral and cognitive neuroscientists now recognize that the mechanisms of operant and Pavlovian conditioning, although important in animal behavior, make only a small contribution to an animal's knowledge (Tomasello & Call, 1997) . These learning mechanisms continue to play a disproportionately large role in laboratory studies, however. Accordingly, the possibility that a given behavior might "merely" be conditioned-and by inference, therefore, performed by a zombielike VFA system-needs attention in neurophysiological studies of perception.
At a minimum, neurophysiological experiments on perception should consider a large set of potential variables, including the state of the system, internally and externally induced state transitions, behavioral contexts, response rules, selective attention, anticipated sensory input, actual sensory input, unconscious processing of sensory information, response selection from alternatives, suppression of unwanted responses, lower level motor commands, and sensory feedback, including that pertaining to the outcome of an action. To distinguish the VFA and VFP systems, it might prove useful, in addition, to contrast situations in which the percept varies in a predictable way, without operantly conditioning the perceptual report. One approach involves the use of probe trials in which the animal receives reinforcement for any response at random or not at all. Experimental conditions in which subjects report the same percept by different responses or report different percepts with the same response can also accomplish a great deal (Batista & Newsome, 2001; Gold & Shadlen, 2001) .
Recent neurophysiological and neuropsychological research has exploited several strategies in identifying the VFP system and distinguishing its operations from that of the VFA system in monkeys. These strategies include the use of bistable percepts, blindsight testing, backward masking, abstract rules, and visual illusions.
PROGRESS IN DISTINGUISHING THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF PERCEPTION AND ACTION

Bistable Percepts
Bistable percepts, including binocular rivalry, permit a variety of experiments on the VFP system in humans (Lumer et al., 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999) and in monkeys Logothetis, Leopold, & Sheinberg, 1996; Logothetis & Schall, 1989 ). Logothetis and his colleagues, for example, presented a series of visual stimuli to monkeys in "observation periods" (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997) . The monkeys had to report their perception of each new stimulus but received reward only at the end of each observation period. One group of visual objects instructed pressing the leftmost of two bars; another required pressing the rightmost bar. Logothetis and his colleagues delivered separate inputs to each eye, and sometimes those inputs differed. When they did, binocular rivalry was expected to result: First, one eye should dominate perception, followed by the other. The good correspondence between monkeys and human subjects in the temporal pattern of dominance by a given eye supported that expectation. Thus, the same sensory input produced two distinctly different perceptual reports, and the neurons in the monkey's visual cortex showed activity that reflected the monkey's reported perception. The monkeys received feedback about erroneous performance for nonrivalrous stimulus in that the observation period ended if the monkey made an incorrect response to such inputs. No feedback occurred, however, for rivalrous stimuli, thus undermining the argument that the key behaviorreporting of the bistable percepts-resulted from operant conditioning. Furthermore, the same motor report could correspond to different percepts. Data of this kind support the idea that neuronal activity reflects perception rather than merely the movement made to report that perception (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997 ). Logothetis and his colleagues found that only a small proportion of the neurons in the low-order visual areas reflected the monkeys' percepts, whereas the majority of neurons in the high-order areas of the ventral stream did so. Bradley et al. (1998) reported analogous results for neurons in the middle temporal area (MT). They used two-dimensional projections of transparent rotating cylinders. In operantly conditioned trials, each eye received a slightly different image of the cylinder, and disparity cues in those images evoked the perception of depth; that is, the cylinders appeared to be three-dimensional. The monkeys reported whether the near part of the cylinder moved to the left or to the right by making an eye movement in the corresponding direction. Probe trials, rewarded randomly at a frequency of 80%, lacked dispar-ity cues. These stimuli also appear three-dimensional, but the perceived surface order reverses spontaneously. That is, the near and far surface of the cylinder appear to alternate in a bistable manner. Thus, as in the studies of Logothetis and his colleagues, the same stimulus could evoke two percepts. Bradley et al. found that, for a given visual input, the activity of many MT neurons correlated with the monkeys' perceptual reports. Stoerig (1995, 1997; ) pioneered a different experimental approach to distinguishing the VFA and VFP systems. They attempted to reproduce the blindsight phenomenon in monkeys by removing the V1 cortex unilaterally. Like patients with blindsight, their monkeys could reach toward single light spots presented in their affected hemifields , which suggested that their VFA system remained relatively intact. However, the same monkeys failed to detect the appearance of visual stimuli in the affected hemifield in two tasks designed to test the VFP system. In the first of these tasks, monkeys with left-hemisphere lesions were presented with two visual stimuli, and the monkeys received reinforcement for touching the rightmost stimulus. When both stimuli appeared in the unaffected hemifield, the monkeys chose correctly. When the rightmost light spot entered the blind field, however, the monkeys did not reach to it but rather reached to the leftmost stimulus. Because that behavior resembles the extinction phenomenon in spatial neglect, Cowey and Stoerig designed a second VFP task. In that task, a trial began when a single light spot appeared in the lower middle of a screen (see Figure  8A ). The monkey was operantly conditioned to touch that spot, and when it did so, the light spot disappeared. If no new light appeared immediately thereafter, this "nonevent" instructed the monkey to reach toward a fixed target located in the intact hemifield (see Figure  8B , middle). When a stimulus flashed in the "good" hemifield, the monkeys accurately and reliably reached toward it (see Figure 8B , left). When no stimulus appeared, they also responded reliably by touching the "no stimulus" box (see Figure 8B , middle). When the stimulus flashed in blind field, control monkeys touched it (Fig. 8B, right) , but the lesioned monkeys touched the fixed "no stimulus" location (see Figure 8C ). Cowey and Stoerig interpreted this response as a report that the monkeys did not perceive stimuli appearing in the "blind" hemifield, which contrasted with the monkeys' ability to touch the stimuli in a simple reach-to-target task.
Blindsight Testing
Those results seem straightforward, but a few problems with their interpretation deserve mention. As noted above, the phenomenon resembles extinction, which is usually interpreted as an attentional deficit. This objection does not raise insuperable difficulties because attention, in this sense, implies awareness in the sense assumed for the VFP system. More important, the two VFP tasks presented more demands than a task involving only a single target. They required dealing with information from two hemifields and response selection from alternatives. Perhaps lesions of V1 cortex affected response guidance using the information from both hemifields rather than visual perception. Notwithstanding this reservation, Cowey and Stoerig have established one method by which the VFA and VFP system might be differentiated in monkeys.
The tactic of having a monkey make a report to indicate a lack of knowledge, which Cowey and Stoerig used in the experiments outlined above, has been developed in a related behavioral paradigm (Hampton, 2001) . In that experiment, monkeys learned to touch one symbolic stimulus to receive a less favored reinforcer 100% of the time or to press a different symbol to have a smaller chance of receiving a preferred reinforcer. If the monkey chose the latter symbol, the probability of reward was equal to the likelihood of performing a memory task correctly. That task required remembering a symbolic stimulus presented as a sample at the beginning of most trials. By touching the former symbolic stimulus, the monkey could report that a sample had not been presented on that trial or that with long memory periods, the probability of reward had decreased. A report of this kind could either reflect a computation concerning reward value and probability or, alternatively, something akin to the perception of either lost or missing information.
Backward Masking
Backward masking provides another opportunity to dissociate the VFA and VFP systems. In V1 cortex, backward masking mostly affects the late component of neuronal responses,~100 ms after the initial visual response (Macknik & Haglund, 1999; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998) . Thus, perception, and therefore the VFP system, appears to depend more on the later phase of V1's neuronal response. By contrast, the VFA system might rely more on its early phase.
Backward masking effectively blocks perception, but participants can nevertheless use masked stimuli to select and trigger movements. Taylor and McCloskey (1990) employed a small stimulus to trigger a reactiontime movement. The trigger stimulus was sometimes followed 50 milliseconds later by a larger masking stimulus. Masking blocked perception of the trigger stimulus but did not affect reaction time, as measured from small stimulus onset. Thus, the VFA system can trigger movements without the intervention of the VFP system. In a separate study, Taylor and McCloskey (1996) showed that participants can also use masked visuospatial stimuli to direct a movement. As in blindsight, perceiving the visuospatial cue was not necessary for selecting a movement or a movement target. Schall (1999, 2000) used backward masking to demonstrate a role for the frontal eye field (FEF) in perceptual processing (see Figure 9 ). They taught monkeys to report, with an eye movement, the presence or absence of a stimulus presented shortly before the mask. Because of that requirement, their task can be thought of as involving the VFP system-in contrast, for example, to the tasks of McCloskey (1990, 1996) , in which the participants performed without perceiving the stimuli. In the experiment of Schall (1999, 2000) , when the monkeys detected the light spot, they made a saccade to its location; if not, there would be no saccade. Human observers reported the presence or absence of stimuli as predicted. Stimulus intensity only slightly exceeded the detection threshold, and the delay between stimulus and mask was adjusted so that the monkeys noticed the stimulus on approximately half of the trials. This permitted Thompson and Schall to compare the trials in which the monkeys reported the stimulus with those in which they did not. They classified FEF neurons into three classes according to the timing of their activity modulation (see Figure 9) . Visual neurons exhibited an early transient response to the presentation of the light spot. Selection neurons also had early responses but, in addition, a greater degree of sustained modulation. Movement neurons modulated later. Comparison of the trials in which the monkey detected the light spot (hits) with those when it failed to do so (misses) revealed differences in neuronal activity (see Figure 9 , bottom). Although the strong initial response in visual neurons slightly differed between hits and misses, Thompson and Schall concluded that this initial component of the response alone could not serve as a neuronal correlate of visual perception. Following the initial neuronal response, the firing of both the selection and the movement neurons clearly reflected the monkey's report of stimulus presence. Thompson and Schall suggested that the movement neurons, which they localized in layer 5, reflected the execution of the reporting response. For selection neurons, at least some of which they localized in layer 3, the investigators suggested an involvement in perception and attention rather than a solely motor reporting function. Thompson and Schall hypothesized that selection neurons could participate in a broader network underlying visual perception by means of their projections to extrastriate visual cortex. Although in their experiment, perception (i.e., hits) was inextricably linked with the making of a report (the saccade), one can view their results as indicating that the FEF has a neuronal population mainly involved in the VFP system.
Abstract Rules
Some recent studies have searched for neural activity that reflects abstract behavior-guiding rules. The fact that one can describe a behavior in terms of an abstract rule does not guarantee, however, the subject's awareness of that rule. As an alternative, a monkey might simply learn the action to make in a certain sensory context, however complex the sequence of events that defines that context. This strategy corresponds to a listwise memorization of behavioral contingencies, which the VFA system could subserve.
In a neurophysiological study of anterior frontal cortex neurons, Wallis, Anderson, and Miller (2001) addressed this problem in two ways. First, they used two abstract rules and varied the rule from trial to trial. Second, they used novel stimuli for each day's recording session so that the monkey could not base its decisions on previous experience with stimuli. This experimental design made it much less likely that the monkey could rely on the VFA system. Their experiment involved two rules: a matching rule and a nonmatching rule. The matching rule required the monkey to release a lever if a successively presented visual object was identical to a sample shown previously and to continue to hold the lever if the objects differed. In the nonmatching rule, the monkey released the lever if the objects differed from the sample and continued holding if they matched. A stimulus, presented in the beginning of the trial, indicated the operative rule on each trial. The monkeys successfully followed the operative rule on 70% of trials with novel stimulus material, where 50% correct responses was chance performance. Wallis et al. showed that a large proportion of neurons in the anterior frontal cortex had activity rates that reflected the rule rather than the stimuli presented. Another substantial group of neurons reflected the combination of a particular rule and stimulus.
Unfortunately, Wallis et al. did not report whether they observed rule-specific signals on the first trial with each stimulus, so it remains possible that their rulerelated activity only begins after the subjects gain some trial-and-error experience with a stimulus set. Statistical analysis of such trials would be problematic, with only a few "first trials" each day. Their experiment could be extended, however, to involve the presentation of novel stimuli on every trial. This modification would strengthen the identification of neuronal activity with the VFP system by showing that the cells reflected the rule regardless of experience with any stimulus material involved in applying the rule.
Illusions
Movement of a visual background has a large effect on perception. For example, microstimulation of sites in visual area MT that have sensitivity to motion in small visual fields shifted pursuit of a target in the preferred direction of the neurons, whereas stimulation at sites sensitive to wide-field (visual-background) motion shifted pursuit in the opposite direction (Born, Groh, Zhao, & Lukasewycz, 2000) .
Work in our laboratory (Lebedev, Douglass, Moody, & Wise, 2001 ) employed an illusion that depended on background motion, although it involved motion in discrete steps rather than the continuous, smooth motion studied by Born et al. (2000) . Our experiment took advantage of the fact that in anterior frontal cortex, as elsewhere, a large proportion of neurons show spatial tuning. For example, a cell might have its greatest discharge when a light spot appears to the left of the fixation point. Sensory neurophysiologists might consider (2000), with permission. NOTE: A. On some trials, a target for an eye movement appeared at one of eight possible locations (left). A masking stimulus, consisting of an array covering all eight locations, appeared 50 milliseconds later (right). On the other trials, no target preceded the array. The monkey reported target presence by making a saccade toward its location and target absence by making no saccade. The monkey correctly made saccades to the target on some trials (hits) but also failed to do so on other trials (misses). B. Population activity for hits (solid curves) and misses (dashed curves) in the frontal eye field. C. Activity difference between the hit and miss trials for three populations of neurons (labeled beneath each column). the neuron's response as a receptive field, but it could instead reflect the orientation of spatial attention or the possibility that the light spot will serve as a target of a hand or eye movement. To combine the concepts of receptive, attentional, and motor fields, we use the phrase directional preference when referring to spatial tuning. Our experimental design closely resembled that of Wong and Mack (1981) , described above. To recapitulate their frame-shift illusion, when a background frame shifts more than an attended light spot-to the right, for example-subjects wrongly perceive the spot as jumping to the left (see Figure 2C) . We assumed that neuronal activity in the VFP system should reflect the predicted illusion, whereas that in the VFA system should accurately reflect the physical reality of the light's relocation. After all, the VFA system must directly interact with the physical world, which requires such accuracy. The frameshift illusion provided us an opportunity to force neurons to declare, in a sense, whether their activity reflected what the light spot actually did (VFA activity) or the monkey's perception of what it did (VFP activity), as judged by the monkey's report. For example, take a neuron with a left-directional preference, as measured during the trials that had no discrepancy between the actual and perceived displacements of the light spot. Suppose that, on a particular trial, the attended light spot actually shifted to the right, but because of an induced illusioncaused by the frame shifting simultaneously-the monkey reported that the spot had shifted to the left (as in Figure 2C ). A left-preferring VFP cell should go along with the monkey's report; a left-preferring VFA cell should do otherwise, reflecting either the actual displacement direction of the light spot or the direction of the saccadic eye movement used to make the report.
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BEHAVIORAL AND COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE REVIEWS , was similar to that illustrated in Figure 2 . The upper array (A1) first appeared. Then it disappeared, and after a brief delay, the lower array (A2) became visible at approximately the same location on a video display. Upon that event, the monkey made an eye movement (arrow) to report the perceived direction that the central light spot (gray circle) had shifted. A frame (rectangle) that surrounded the light spot might also shift from A1 to A2 to induce illusions. The monkey made perceptual reports by fixating one of two report targets (unfilled circles) located near the edges of the frame. In A2(a) and A2(b), the monkey reported that the light spot had shifted left, although it had actually shifted right. As illustrated in A2(b), the "left" report could be made with a rightward saccade. The VFP task, A(a) and A(b), contrasted with a visionfor-action (VFA) task, A(c) and A(d), which required only that the monkey make an eye movement to fixate the light spot. Otherwise, the movements and visual inputs closely matched in the two tasks. For example, the stimuli presented in A(a) (VFP task) closely resembled those in A(c) (VFA task), and likewise for A(b) and A(d). The dashed vertical lines provide a reference for illustration; the monkey saw no such cues. B. Population activity in anterior frontal cortex. Each cell in this population showed a significant activity difference between its preferred (solid curves) and nonpreferred (dashed curves) directions and was selected for this analysis on that basis. Furthermore, that difference corresponded to the report. For example, cells with a left directional preference showed high levels of activity when the monkey reported that the light spot had shifted to the left, regardless of which direction it had actually shifted and regardless of which direction of eye movement was used to make the report. The gray bar shows baseline activity ± 3 SD. C. Net directional signal in the VFP task, which shows the difference between the solid and dashed curves in B.
Note that neurons with directional signals in the VFP task (left) had no such directionality in the VFA task (middle and right). Lebedev, Douglass, Moody, and Wise (2001) concluded that these cells participated selectively in the VFP system.
We trained a monkey on two tasks (see Figure 10A ), both of which involve the presentation of an attended light spot embedded in a background frame. One task, which we call here the VFA task, required the monkey to make a saccade to an attended light spot after it shifted (see Figure 10Ac and d). In the other task, termed the VFP task, the same light spots appeared in a similar frame, but the monkey made an eye movement to a reporting target instead of to the light spot (see Figure  10Aa and b). The reporting targets always appeared near the left and right edges of the frame, and the monkey had previously learned to report leftward shifts of the attended light spot with an eye movement to the leftmost reporting target and vice versa.
Behavioral evidence indicated that the monkey experienced the illusion as predicted. Specifically, if the frame shifted by a larger amount than the attended light spot (as in Figures 2B, 2C, and 10Aa) , the monkey reported that the spot had moved in the direction opposite to the frame shift. We further confirmed the similarity of the monkey's perception to that of human subjects by observing the monkey's behavior when the spot and the frame shifted coherently, that is, in the same direction and by the same amount. In this condition, human participants did not perceive the spot as shifting, and similarly, the monkey reported left and right displacements approximately at chance level, as if the monkey had guessed. As a further precaution against an operantly conditioned response, we introduced the illusory-and coherent-motion probe trials months after the monkey had learned the basic task, which simply involved reporting which direction the attended light spot had shifted. These probe trials had two important characteristics: They remained relatively rare, and the monkey received reinforcement for any response on those trials. One important note: If the monkey simply adapted its behavior to that reinforcement, it would have made the reports predicted by the human psychophysics only about half of the time. The monkey did so much more frequently, nearly 83% of the time. Thus, the behavioral results supported our conclusion that the monkey made a perceptual report, which did not reflect operant conditioning alone.
We observed two populations of cells in the anterior frontal cortex. One population reflected perceptual Figure 10 . VFA cells, however, showed a directional signal that reflected eye movement direction, and unlike the cell class illustrated in Figure 10 , this directional signal persisted in the VFA task (middle and right). Format as in Figures 10B and C . B. We selected a different, although related, population of cells on the basis of their significant directional signals in the VFA task (right), then examined that directional signal in the VFP task (left). These cells showed greater directional selectivity in the VFA task. Lebedev, Douglass, Moody, and Wise (2001) found that these VFA cells were intermingled with VFP cells (Figure 10 ) in the anterior frontal cortex.
reports about a visual stimulus, whereas intermingled neurons reflected the direction of stimulus and eye movement. The activity of the former group was consistent with their participation in the VFP system (see Figure 10) , and that of the latter group was consistent with the VFA system (see Figure 11 ). These neuronal subpopulations were selected by analyzing cell activity in one task only (VFP or VFA task). Then, their activity patterns were compared between the two tasks. It is important to note that these two tasks did not require different amounts of information. To understand why this is important, imagine a related experiment in which a tilted line segment, much like that in Figure 4B , appears to the left or to the right of a central fixation point. A participant might report whether the top of the line segment tilted to the left or to the right. To make such a report, the participant would use the information in the display to make an identification of stimulus orientation. Alternatively, the participant could report whether the line segment appeared to the left or to the right of fixation. That is, the participant could use the same stimulus for localization. If the experimenter made the tilt subtle, identification could be arbitrarily difficult, with localization unaffected. However, one could not claim a dissociation between localization and identification systems, merely that the system had ample information with which to localize the stimulus but inadequate information with which to determine its orientation. Accordingly, in the tasks illustrated in Figure 10A , the information requirements were equated to the extent possible. In both the VFA and VFP tasks, the decision about where and when to make a saccadic eye movement was based on the displacement of the attended light spot by the amounts that matched exactly in the two tasks. Similarly, both tasks involved saccadic eye movements that had equal accuracy requirements. Accordingly, the amount of information alone does not account for the neural dissociation.
In our experiment, the reporting saccades did not necessarily correspond to the direction of the perceived displacement. Sometimes, to fixate the left report target, the monkey had to make a rightward saccade (see Figure  10Ab) and vice versa. The activity of VFP neurons corresponded to the monkey's reports rather than either the direction of the saccades used to make those reports or the actual displacement of the light spot. For example, a VFP neuron with a left directional preference exhibited elevated activity: (a) when the spot moved to the left and the monkey reported leftward displacement, (b) when the spot did not move to the left but the monkey experienced an illusion and reported leftward displacement, (c) when the monkey reported leftward displacement with a rightward saccade, and (d) when the monkey reported a leftward displacement after the light spot and frame shifted coherently. As a population, VFP neurons showed a clear directional signal when the monkey made a report corresponding to the cell's directional preference (see Figures 10B and 10C, left) . However, the same neurons lacked directional signals when their activity was monitoring during performance of the VFA task, regardless of whether we matched the trials for movement direction (see Figures 10B and 10C , middle) or for sensory inputs ( Figures 10B and 10C, right) . Thus, the directional signal carried by the VFP neuronal population showed specificity for the perceptual task and for the direction of light-spot shift reported.
VFA neurons participated in both tasks. First, we selected VFA-like activity from data obtained as the monkey performed the VFP task (see Figure 11A , left). These were cells that reflected the direction that the light spot had actually moved on the screen or the direction of the saccadic eye movement used to make the report. When, at a later time, the monkeys performed the VFA task, a strong directional signal remained in trials matched by saccade direction (see Figure 11A , middle). This finding was to be expected because these neurons reflected saccade direction, and the monkey made saccades in both tasks. Second, we selected VFA neurons from recordings made during performance of the VFA task (see Figure 11B) . Although this population of VFA cells showed some persistence of a directional signal in the VFP task, that signal showed significant attenuation, indicating that it had considerable selectivity for the VFA task. Note that the attenuation of the directional signal was especially pronounced in the period prior to movement onset (see Figure 11B) .
The classification of anterior frontal cortex cells into VFA and VFP populations was neither all or none nor likely to be unique to that region of cortex (Lebedev et al., 2001) . We observed intermediate types of neurons frequently, as expected of a distributed neural network.
CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that the VFA and VFP systems can be dissociated behaviorally and neurophysiologically but not anatomically. High-order cortical areas, such as the posterior parietal cortex of the dorsal stream, the inferior temporal cortex, of the ventral stream, and the anterior frontal cortex all play important roles both in on-line control of visually guided movement (the VFA system) and in visual perception (the VFP system). Even when their network elements have little anatomical segregation, however, neurophysiological and neuropsychological studies can examine these two systems independently. Recently, experiments involving bistable percepts, blindsight, backward masking, abstract rules, and illusions have distinguished the VFA and VFP systems in monkeys. For example, partially separate but intermingled populations of neurons represent VFP and VFA operations in anterior frontal cortex (Lebedev et al., 2001) .
The existence of visuomotor signals in higher order cortical areas might seem enigmatic, but at least two explanations seem most straightforward. One possibility is that this visuomotor information contributes to perception, but that what is perceived is one's action. On this view, actions produced by the VFA system can come to awareness either through reafference or through efference copy (see Figure 1, dashed lines) . A second possibility, not inconsistent with the first, is that the dissociation of VFA and VFP signals in higher brain areas reflects specialized information-processing specializations in the two systems. Two of vision's benefits contradict each other to some extent: One, the VFA part, involves achieving a level of computational accuracy needed for interacting with the physical world; the other, the VFP part, concerns acquiring and generating more abstract and relational knowledge about "what may be out there," as Gregory (2001) said in the opening quotation.
Figure 12 summarizes our main conclusions (cf. Figure 5) . We think that there are several VFA systems. One guides primitive visuomotor behaviors, such as those involving the transformation of visual input into the motor commands necessary to orient, locomote, or reach toward or away from that input. These functions are the province of a mainly subcortical VFA system, one that includes the diencephalon, brainstem, and spinal cord (see also Day & Brown, 2001 , for a similar view). Such behaviors have been called "standard sensorimotor mappings" , in which the input directly guides action, either as a target to be approached and perhaps acquired or the one to be avoided (see Table 1 ). By contrast, in nonstandard mapping, the visual input does not serve as either a target or antitarget. Two kinds of nonstandard mapping have been termed transformational mapping (such as that employed by Lurito et al., 1991) and arbitrary mapping (see , for a discussion of transformational and arbitrary mapping). In transformational mapping, a spatial algorithm or transform is applied to a stimulus to guide movements. An example of transformational mapping is choosing a target on a grid that is always one step up and two to the right of a cued location. In arbitrary mapping, the location of a stimulus is irrelevant, and its other features guide movement. An example of arbitrary mapping is stopping in response to red signals but proceeding in response to green ones (and a trickier choice after a yellow signal). According to one view, a cortical VFA system that mainly involves posterior parietal and frontal cortex functions to override primitive, standard-mapping functions in order to implement transformational mapping routines. Another cortical system, involving inferior temporal and frontal cortex, functions to override standard mappings to implement arbitrary ones .
In yet another form of nonstandard mapping (see Table 1 ), here termed abstract mapping, a stimulus does not map to a response according to "what is out there" but rather according to "guesses-predictive hypothesesof what may be out there," to quote Gregory (2001, p. 21) again. This function is the province of the VFP system. and Vision-for-Perception (VFP) (stippled stripes) Systems, as Envisioned Here. NOTE: Anterior premotor cortex here includes the presupplementary motor area, anterior cingulate motor areas, and the rostral part of the lateral premotor cortex. Posterior premotor cortex includes the supplementary motor area proper, caudal cingulate motor areas, and the caudal part of the lateral premotor cortex. M1 = primary motor cortex. The width of the alternating stippled and gray bars depicts the bias toward VFA (solid gray) and VFP (stippled) functions. Once the difference between the VFA and VFP systems is viewed as a distinction between using available and remembered sensory information to guide action, on one hand, as opposed to using hypotheses about the world (and, perhaps, oneself) , on the other, many of the conundrums concerning consciousness become less confusing. When confirmed, correctly or incorrectly, those guesses comprise an animal's reality, as they do ours. One need not posit an all-or-none distinction among animal species in the use of guesses to guide action. Some might use guesses often, some rarely, and some never; the guesses must vary widely in sophistication.
The precise moment when, during evolution, some animal started using guesses to guide behavior was not occasioned by fanfare or claps of thunder. A step of such monumental significance must have begun humbly, not really as a step at all, but more likely as a gentle adjustment from using visual inputs and stored visual information, alone, to using novel guesses about that information as well. In many primates, especially significant guesses appear to involve abstract relations among objects and conspecifics discerned from "millions of years of interacting with objects" and in social groups (Tomasello & Call, 1997) . The distinction between visually guided and guess-guided behavior leaves the hard problem of consciousness in its privileged place but clears away some bugbears and other disagreeable creatures of the imagination, perhaps including zombies. Confirmed guesses comprise our most intimate reality, but it is easy to overestimate their importance in the life of any animal, including us. Known as insights when they involve new knowledge (Tanji & Hoshi, 2001) , it is fortunate that they make up only a small part of what we can see and grasp. Indeed, the efficiency of the VFA system makes such insights practicable in the first place. In the words of Alfred North Whitehead (1911) , It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy books, and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations that we can perform without thinking about them. (p. 61)
